Washington e Toronto, 1954: a inteligência da Força Aérea estuda o 'disco voador' canadense da Avro e teme que os soviéticos já tenham um

[SECRET, riscado] [manuscrito: Int 2-2-7] DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, Headquarters United States Air Force, Washington 25, D. C. SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY BOARD TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF, USAF. SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY BOARD REPORT ON AVRO PROJECT Y2. November 1954. [manuscrito: Report] This document consists of 9 pages. Copy Number 2 of 33 copies. [SECRET, riscado] [manuscrito: DS 55-0323-2]

[SECRET, riscado] DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, Headquarters United States Air Force, Washington 25, D. C. 10 December 1954. Lieutenant General Donald L. Putt, Deputy Chief of Staff, Development, Headquarters United States Air Force, Washington, D. C. Dear Don: In response to your request for SAB comments on the Avro "Saucer" project, the SAB has taken the following action: The Aircraft and Propulsion Panels were briefed on September 28 by representatives of Hq. ARDC, at the time of the Fall meeting of the Board in Omaha. The tentative conclusions of both panels immediately after this briefing were to the effect that this project warranted no more than limited support. However, to assure thorough consideration of this project, I requested representatives of these two panels to supplement the briefings given to them at Omaha by a visit to A. V. Roe Canada Ltd., Malton, Ontario. With the advice of Clark Millikan and Dean Soderberg, a select committee was chosen to conclude this study. It was composed of Dean Soderberg, Chairman of the Propulsion Panel and senior member of the group; Professor Markham, of the Aircraft Panel; and Mr. Donovan, who has been serving both as a member of the Aircraft Panel and as liaison member with the Propulsion Panel. The attached report of this group is forwarded with my approval, representing the results of the SAB's completed study. Sincerely, /s/ J. H. DOOLITTLE, Acting Chairman, Scientific Advisory Board, Office of the Chief of Staff. Inclosure. [SECRET, riscado]

[SECRET, riscado] December 6, 1954. General James H. Doolittle, Acting Chairman, Scientific Advisory Board, Office of the Chief of Staff, Headquarters United States Air Force, Washington, D. C. Dear General Doolittle: At your request we constituted ourselves an ad hoc group to conclude the studies of the A.V. Roe Company project Y2, which was presented to the Scientific Advisory Board at the Omaha meetings in September of this year. We visited the A. V. Roe Company in Toronto on November 17 and 18. After considering the information available to us, we present the following report. We wish to commend the officials of the A. V. Roe Company for a most courteous and well-planned reception, making the fullest possible use of the available time. The Y2 is an airplane of circular plan form, originally built up around a radial flow turbojet with the exhaust capable of being deflected downward in an annular jet for take-off and hovering near the ground. The airplane is designed for supersonic flight at high altitude, under which condition the exhaust jet is directed horizontally rearwards. The air is taken in vertically from the above for [continua] 1 [SECRET, riscado]

hovering; for level flight the intake is changed to a normal frontal inlet by a set of slides and doors. In later versions the radial engine has been replaced by radially disposed axial flow turbojets of conventional type. This modification was originally considered as an intermediate version which might simplify the development procedures, but as the radial engine has been more realistically appraised, it is now looked upon as an alternative form of equal promise. It is evident that the invention involves a whole array of formidable problems of research and development. Even in the smallest versions the outer diameter of the radial flow turbine is about twenty feet. The entire rotor must be supported on air bearings in the radial as well as the axial direction, and it is evident that the accompanying problems of mechanical design are very difficult. The design requires that very large air flow (a minimum of about 800 lb/s) be regulated by a complicated system of mechanical shutters on the inlet as well as on the outlet side. The problems of stability in hovering, in forward flight, and in the transition between the two modes naturally demand considerable attention. The many structural problems of an unconventional nature likewise require much study. It is evident, even with only a casual study, that the process of development would be lengthy and costly in the extreme, even by present standards in military aircraft. The justification for entering into 2

such an undertaking must depend on (a) the significance of the objectives which the new airplane claims to fill and (b) the soundness of the means proposed to attain these objectives. The key feature on which the design of the Y2 is based is the utilization for hovering of the pressure built up in the center of an annular jet stream. This pressure build-up increases the lift at standstill close to the ground in such a fashion as to indicate the practicability of hovering a few feet off the ground with engines whose static sea level thrust, without this augmentation from ground effect, would be less than the airplane gross weight. Also, because of the nature of the ground effect, the aircraft would be stable with respect to height when hovering; that is, it would not require pilot attention to hold a height above the ground, although it would require control to maintain its attitude. The thrust augmentation for hovering obtained by A. V. Roe in small scale tests is of the order of 60 to 80%. Because the appropriate variables were not investigated and the pertinent measurements not made during the tests, data are not available to extrapolate this result properly to predict accurately full scale augmentation factors. There are many features which could make the full scale augmentation factors smaller but very little likelihood of their being larger than in the model. The possibility of stable hovering is, nevertheless, an engaging feature. Unfortunately, it has dominated the evolution of the con- 3

figuration to such an extent that performance in level flight appears to have been seriously compromised. Since forward flight is, after all, the important function of any airplane, we have attempted to examine into the inventor's claim for the flight characteristics with particular care. The inventor has advanced claims for favorable forward flight characteristics on the basis that the radial flow engine has a very favorable thrust to weight ratio (about .22), that the specific thrust on the projected area of the plane (about 600, excluding air intakes) is unusually high, and that the drag characteristics of the plane are very favorable. While not enough information is available to settle all of these points, we are compelled to take exception to all three of these claims. The specific engine weight is no longer unusual and would not in itself justify the radial engine development. Moreover, the radial engine possesses certain inherent limitations in pressure ratio and component efficiencies which are detrimental to good fuel consumption in comparison with the axial flow type. The shift to conventional turbojets has, of course, altered the situation, but it has not strengthened the claims based on the engine. The high thrust per frontal area is in part due to the fact that all discussions so far have been made around planes with no pay load. The situation with respect to drag appears to us the most serious, however, since we feel that the drag may have been underestimated by a factor of two. Very 4

lengthy and expensive experiments are needed to settle these questions with finality. The inventor has assumed that some improvement in the drag situation might be obtained through boundary layer suction. The alleged gain from this source is associated with the distribution of the exhaust jet over the trailing edge of the airplane. It is not wholly impossible that such a gain might in fact be present, but no reliable test information is available at the present time on this point. In this respect this airplane differs from more conventional types only because the exhaust jet is distributed over the trailing edge of the wing. The circular plan form offers no particular advantage in this connection. We are confronted, therefore, with an airplane development which does not appear to possess any intrinsic advantages either with the original radial engine or with the spoke arrangement of conventional turbojets. The pressure recovery on the induction side is certain to be poor for both alternatives; even with the utmost development of details it could not approach the performance of conventional airplanes. The ducting on the exhaust side presents equally formidable difficulties from the point of view of losses, and the gain due to boundary layer suction is only conjectural. These things might have been compensated for if the drag characteristics of the plane configuration could be demonstrated to be favorable. There is no 5

information to indicate that this is so. No basic laws appear to have been transgressed in the design. It is merely a question of overemphasis on the hovering characteristics without any assurance that the level flight characteristics would be tolerable. In arriving at a recommendation for action by the United States Air Force, we have attempted to bring into focus several considerations. The kind of imaginative thinking about unconventional aircraft which the inventor has displayed certainly has a place, and there is perhaps not enough of it in the planning operations of the USAF. When a scheme of this kind is ready for more serious exploitation, however, certain considerations are essential. The dreams must stand the test of hardheaded theoretical and experimental evaluation. The argument that such a procedure, if applied to aircraft developments fifty years ago, would have prevented powered flight is a specious one. The development of an engine such as the Y2, if it is to be carried to a flight article of some kind, is an undertaking of such a magnitude that it simply cannot be undertaken on a mere hunch. We do not feel that the inventor can support the claims he has made for it, particularly with reference to level flight. Moreover, we find a serious lack of attempt at a systematic exploration of the various key aerodynamic phenomena involved. There must also be a set of goals for the aircraft, which would place it in a class ahead of 6

other developments in performance, if the basic ideas should be capable of realization. We do not feel that the objectives of the development have been clearly formulated. In particular, we feel that there has been a preoccupation with the hovering characteristics to such an extent that the more direct essentials of the aircraft have been lost sight of. We do not question the ability of the A. V. Roe Company to undertake successfully any well-conceived project in the aircraft field which lies within their material resources. Our visit confirmed our high opinion of their design and production activities in jet aircraft and engines. We have developed the suspicion, however, that the responsible designers in the A. V. Roe engineering groups are not thoroughly sold on the Y2 project. It is manifestly impossible for us to prove this contention or to make this assertion officially with the company. We feel convinced, however, that the best talents of the A. V. Roe organization have not been drawn upon in the evaluation of this project. This statement is made without prejudice toward the inventor, who impressed us as a talented and sincere man with a great deal of imagination, but who for this very reason cannot be expected to present a fully impartial critique. Full support from some of the leading designers outside of this particular group could perhaps have presented a more convincing argument for support. 7

[SECRET, riscado] On the basis of the above, we recommend against any contractual support for this project until much greater potentialities have been demonstrated by A. V. Roe's own analysis. Sincerely yours, Signed: Allen F. Donovan, John R. Markham, C. Richard Soderberg, Chairman. 8 [SECRET, riscado]

[SECRET, riscado] AFOIN-2C1, Mr Bollum/erh/55867, 1 October 1954. [manuscrito: M/R] MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD. PROBLEM: 1. To make a final report on a special project assigned to Mr. C. W. Bollum, Sr., for the purpose of investigating possible Soviet capabilities for developing and producing a Vertical Take-Off Aircraft which might be similar in appearance to a "Flying Saucer". FACTS AND DISCUSSION: 2. In the Magazine Section of the Washington Post, dated 13 December 1953, there appeared an article which reported the development of a flying saucer by the A.V. Roe Canada, Limited of Toronto. The article stated that Lt. Gen. Donald L. Putt, Director of ARDC, had visited this company and had viewed this flying saucer. Other information given in the article impressed Mr. Bollum with the thought that here was the first factual evidence that it was possible to build a flying saucer. If it was possible for Canada to build a flying saucer, then it was also possible for the Soviets to build one. Mr. Bollum requested that he be authorized to initiate a special project for the purpose of determining Soviet capabilities in this field. Such permission was granted by Col. T. W. Wolfe, Chief of the Future Estimates Branch. 3. With the aid and assistance of Squadron Leader George C. Wainwright, RAF, the project was launched by going to the U.S. Patent Office and reading a patent filed by the A.V. Roe people on a device entitled "A Gas-Turbine Engine Aircraft". The patent application for this device was first filed in the U.K. on 21 August 1952. This patent pointed out the feasibility of the project. Bollum and Wainwright then traveled to Baltimore to discuss the project with personnel of ARDC. It was on this visit that Lt. Col. V. L. Gossick first disclosed the information regarding the application of the Coanda Effect to the Project "Y" design. Several more visits were made to ARDC and after discussing the project with several engineers and officers, Mr. Bollum and Squadron Leader Wainwright decided that there was little doubt that a "state of the art" capability did, in fact, exist, and that their next step was to investigate the possibility that the Soviets already had possession of such information. 4. Through contacts with intelligence officers in the Office of the Director of Air Intelligence, Ottawa, Canada, Squadron Leader Wainwright learned of the existence of intelligence information concerning possible German Flying Saucer projects. These were rumored to have existed at the end of World War II. TDY was authorized for Bollum and Wainwright to travel to Ottawa to discuss the subject with the Air Intelligence personnel. As a result of this trip copies of the pertinent information were forwarded to Mr. Bollum from D.A.I. Ottawa. In brief, there is information on four Germans. [SECRET, riscado] [manuscrito: DS 55-0323-3]

[SECRET, riscado] a. George Klein who, as of April 1953 resided in Hamburg, claims to have been chief engineer of all flying disc projects. However, his principal importance seems to be that he knew of the existence of such projects and has called attention to other Germans in this field. b. Otto Habermohl, who has not been heard of since the end of the war, is reported to have had a project for a 16 meter diameter flying saucer which was test flighted on 14 February 1945 at Holice. c. Rudolf Schriever, who died in 1945, was a designer/test pilot at BMW Works at Prague. He is reported to have constructed a flying saucer, which at a trial in April 1945 failed to leave the ground. d. Robert Miethe, who is supposed to have entered the U.S. in 1953, is reported to have constructed a 43 meter diameter flying saucer called the "V-7", which is reported to have flown with a crew of three in 1944. In August 1944 the Cesko-Moravske Works in Prague is reported to have received a production order for a short series, but none had been finished by the end of the war. Miethe remained in Breslaw, whence he escaped in an ME-163 one jump ahead of the Russians. The Russians captured three of Miethe's principal assistants and his workshops. Miethe, according to the Canadians, came into this country as an emigrant. It is of interest to note that in March of 1954, a man using the name Bruno Berberich and who claims to have entered this country in 1953, forwarded to a Senator from Ohio a manuscript and drawings depicting how he would build a flying saucer. These were in turn forwarded to the Legislation and Liaison Division of Headquarters, USAF, who sent them to AFOIN. AFOIN forwarded the documents to ATIC for translation and evaluation. Mr. Bollum was assured by Mr. Arcier of ATIC that he would receive a copy of the results as soon as ATIC had completed the translation. To date no such information has been received and therefore Mr. Bollum is not able to report the results obtained. The big question would seem to be whether or not this man Berberich could be Miethe. 5. Upon return to Washington Bollum and Wainwright again went to ARDC Baltimore where they were briefed on the U.S. interest in Canada's project and informed of the political and international complication involved. At this time both were requested to handle the whole project on a sensitive basis until notified by ARDC that arrangements between U.S. and Canada had been completed. In accordance with such request, briefings were limited to General Samford, General Lewis, Colonel Morrow, Colonel Eriksen, Colonel True, Colonel Wolfe, Captain Rooney, USN, and Lt. Colonel Farrior. 6. In April Colonel True received permission for an Air Room briefing of key AFOIN personnel, which was attended by the Branch and Division Chiefs. About the 1st of May a request came for briefing the Classen Committee, who were considering the future material requirements for the Strategic Air Command. On 26 May 1954 key analysts of the Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California, were briefed at the request of Colonel True and permission was [SECRET, riscado]

[SECRET, riscado] given to brief the engineering personnel of the Los Angeles Air Force Development Office. 7. An "Air Force Only" restriction was dropped in June 1954 and the following have been briefed since: Chief of Naval Operations and Staff, Chief of Staff U.S. Army and Staff, Commandant of the Marine Corps and Staff, Key Personnel of CIA-OSI, Mr. Eiselstein of ATIC, Intelligence personnel of SAC, TAC, ADC, ARDC, AFSS, AFSSOP, NSA, and Requirements Officer of the Air War College. A copy of the briefing is attached as TAB A. 8. On 15 June 1954, Bollum and Wainwright visited the A.V. Roe Limited, Toronto, Canada. One day was spent discussing Project "Y" and information of German and/or Soviet interest in such unconventional aircraft. Mr. Frost, the Chief Engineer on the project and designer of the radial flow jet engine, demonstrated by use of laboratory models all the principles of the Coanda Effect, the air bearings, and the control system contemplated. Such demonstrations left little doubt in the minds of anyone present that the project would be a success. Mr. Frost had previously gone to Europe to interrogate George Klein and in addition had had access to many flying saucer reports from Europe. He firmly stated that there was no doubt in his mind that the Soviets are ahead of the Western Nations in the development of a true vertical take-off aircraft. 9. Recent news articles indicate that both the U.S. and U.K. have other projects in being which are in the field of Vertical Take-Off Aircraft (VTO). CONCLUSIONS: 10. In conclusion, it appears that the chances of success are good for Project "Y" or Project "Ladybird" as it is known in the USAF. If this is the case a breakthrough in the aeronautical "State of the Art" has occurred which will revolutionize aircraft design and air warfare. If we accept the possibilities of such designs then we must also conclude that the Soviets must at the least have the capability to have such aircraft almost as soon as the Western Nations. At the other end of the possibilities, we must consider the chance that the Soviets are several years ahead of the U.S. at this time. Perhaps one of the most important results of this investigation has been that such unconventional aircraft are not considered as fantastic as previously and the emphasis will shift from disproving flying saucer reports to proving such reports. The effect of a successful flight will be far reaching. A new look will have to be taken at the design of many categories of military equipment; i.e. radars, guided missiles, armament, antiaircraft artillery, etc. It is possible that such capabilities could very radically change estimates for the period of 1960-65. RECOMMENDATIONS: 11. In the last part of the briefing (Tab A) certain recommendations have been made. It was felt at the time that the various offices of the Directorate of Intelligence would take some action as a result of the briefing. As of this date Mr. Bollum is unaware of any action being taken by any other office to 3 [SECRET, riscado]

[SECRET, riscado] assume any responsibility in this field. Informally, ATIC personnel have indicated to Mr. Bollum opinion that the success of Project "Y2" is very doubtful and that it is not expected that ATIC will show any great interest or take any action other than that normally taken by the Unidentified Flying Object (UFO) personnel. As a result of this inactivity, very little new has been accomplished in the last few months toward ascertaining Soviet capabilities. It is therefore recommended that the following actions be requested by the Director of Intelligence. a. Inasmuch as Vertical Take-Off aircraft similar in appearance to a flying saucer will be test flown in a matter of 18 months with a possible production within three years, it is believed appropriate at this time to divorce the reports, analysis, and estimates of earth produced flying saucers from the UFO activity at ATIC. Such items of intelligence should be handled through normal material and equipment channels in the D/I. b. All reports of sightings of UFO's in areas immediately adjacent to the Soviet Union and Satellites should be re-examined in light of the possibility that the Soviets could be well ahead of the U.S. and Canada in the development and service testing of such an aircraft. c. A section should be inserted in the Basic Air Intelligence Requirement Manual and an AFM should be prepared on "Intelligence Collection Guidance Manual on Vertical Take-Off Aircraft". d. Necessary support should be requested of other government agencies in an attempt to locate Robert Miethe and Bruno Berberich. After location of the above men, steps should be taken to have them interrogated by personnel familiar with the entire background on this project. e. A project should be established to estimate probable military applications for such an aircraft and the extent to which requirements and designs for other military equipment would be affected. As a part of this project, a short discourse on airfield requirements might be included. f. A collection requirement should be placed on all agencies in the field including Attaches. g. All intelligence estimates for the 1960-65 period should include a statement on the possibility of operational use of saucer shaped aircraft and the effect of such use on other equipment estimates. h. To insure that intelligence information and requirements for action are properly integrated into the existing intelligence organization, it is suggested that an individual who is knowledgeable on the background of this project be appointed as coordinator for the Director of Intelligence, HQ, USAF, on Unconventional Vertical Take-Off Aircraft. This coordinator, in addition to his function with the Director of Intelligence, should also be the active liaison contact between the D/I and other interested commands and agencies when requests are received for briefings, etc. 4 [SECRET, riscado]

[SECRET, riscado] 12. Subject matter will not be submitted for inclusion in the D/I Policy Book or the Daily Staff Digest. ACTION: 14. Inasmuch as Mr. Bollum is the most knowledgeable person in the D/I on the subject of this project, it is recommended that he be appointed coordinator for the Director of Intelligence and that he be authorized to proceed as necessary to accomplish the desired results on the recommendations made above. COORDINATION: Col. E. M. Kirton, AFOIN-2C1 - Ext. 56239 [rubrica]; For: Col. V. L. Zoller, AFOIN-2C - Ext. 71577 [rubrica]; Col. J. J. Morrow, AFOIN-2 - Ext. 71110 [rubrica]. 5 [SECRET, riscado]

[SECRET, riscado] TAB "A". BRIEF ON AN UNCONVENTIONAL AIRCRAFT POSSIBLE BY 1960. INTRODUCTION. The purpose of this briefing is two-fold. First, I will attempt to tell you of a project being financed by the U.S. Air Force and as a result thereof to dispel to the greatest extent possible any doubt in your minds that such a project is feasible and desirable. Second, I will attempt to show that there is a very good possibility that we may not be the first nation to successfully fly such an aircraft. In order not to take up your time with uninteresting technical considerations and information, I will make the first part very brief. However, if anyone desires more information on the design, performance, operation, etc., I am prepared to go into a more detailed discussion complete with slides at the end of the regular briefing. * * * The "State of the Art" being one of the most important considerations in a technical estimate, we have attempted to ascertain what effort is being made in this field. Through various sources it was determined that the foremost authority on the theories surrounding such an aircraft was a Mr. Jack Frost, an aeronautical engineer presently employed by the A.V. Roe Limited of Canada. Some indication of Mr. Frost's capability may be derived from the fact that he was project engineer on the CF-100 in Canada. The principal sources of information covered in this brief were ARDC, Baltimore; AFDRD, Washington; DAI, Ottawa; and A. V. Roe Limited of Canada. Before going any further, I wish to emphasize that the interest of the HQ, USAF D/I in this subject is solely from the foreign aspect and particularly as it concerns the Soviet capabilities. Any emphasis that we may give to the Research and Development program in this country is a bonus and not intentional. * * * The project of which I am about to speak is known as Project "Y2" in Canada and as Project "Ladybird" by the USAF. This vehicle is designated as a "Flat Vertical Take-Off Supersonic Gyroplane" by the A.V.Roe Company. In appearance it is similar to the normal conception most people have of a flying saucer. This is probably the best reason for not calling this vehicle a flying saucer. This unconventional aircraft is not strictly a new idea. This particular idea has been in existence for several years and during the last four years attempts have been made in Great Britain, Canada, and the U.S.A. to interest someone in financing the development of the gyroplane. In January of 1954 the Canadian government agreed to finance the project to the extent of $2,000,000. However, due to some belief that Canada might be somewhat limited in facilities and finances to complete the development in the least possible time, and the [SECRET, riscado] [manuscrito: DS 55-0323-4]

[SECRET, riscado] further possibility and danger that a foreign power not entirely friendly to the U.S. might achieve the desired results sooner, the USAF has made an agreement with the Canadian government and A.V. Roe Company to take over the complete development effort. The prime contract appears to be with the A.V. Roe Canada, Limited and upon my last visit to the factory, they were well along the way in the preparation of drawings and possibly at this time are starting fabrication of parts. As of the last report known to us, it was expected that the flight test of the first model would take place in the Spring of 1956. By this time some of you would like to see a picture of this aircraft. I have two artist conceptions (Slide 1). This slide is to depict landings and take-offs from other than established airfields. (Slide 2). This slide is for the purpose of showing a naval or marine use by launching from a submarine. An earlier model called Project "Y" or Project "OMEGA" which would have used the same engine (Slide 3) but would have been flat on the aft end similar in shape to the letter Omega. Two versions of small research type Vertical Take-Off aircraft, identified as Project "Y" and Project "Y2" have now been designed. Each project is essentially a simple proposal for the construction of a very large radial flow gas turbine engine, suitably shaped and covered to form a flying wing which is said to be the minimum aircraft that can be designed around a turbo-jet engine. The engines are designed to fly "edge-on" to the wind instead of axially, as in the case of the more conventional types. Each engine is basically a large diameter airborne rotor disc, supported by an air bearing which employs compressor bleed air as its only form of lubrication. Stability and control, will be dominated by the gyroscopic reactions of the rotor. Such an aircraft would have some very fundamental advantages; such as: a. The manufacturing simplicity that results. b. The much greater than one thrust/weight ratio. c. The very high thrust/frontal area ratio. d. The gyroscopic stability. e. The ability to operate without prepared landing fields; this being the most important consequence of the thrust/weight ratio being much greater than one. The Project "Y" design which utilized the same engine, but had a slightly different configuration was designed to take off and land with its longitudinal axis at an angle of approximately 60 degrees with the ground and was supported by a landing gear which gave it the appearance of a "Praying Mantis". The Project "Y2", unlike the earlier model, is designed to take off and land with its longitudinal axis parallel to the ground and has no landing gear whatsoever. One other great difference between the two designs is that the first design required surface controls or elevons while the latter design has no surface controls at all. The "flat vertical take-off" technique, in the Project "Y2" version, has a further fundamental advantage of great significance in that the peripheral jet using the Coanda Effect produces a powerful cushion of air between the 2 [SECRET, riscado]

[SECRET, riscado] aircraft and the ground which eliminates the possibility of severe impact on landing. Tests have shown that the jet lift is increased several times over that of a flat disc near the ground. Advantages of such a technique are as follows: a. It is safer and more acceptable to pilots. b. The gyroscopic plane is parallel with the ground. c. It improves the use of the aircraft in the transport category. (Slide 5). In general, the proposed aircraft consists of a very large radial flow gas turbine engine disposed between two concentric rings. It is estimated that the engine will produce nearly 50,000 lbs. Sea Level Static Thrust. Depending on the final design and balance the circular plan form may need to be modified to accommodate trim flaps. The air intakes are also circular in plan, the skins extending across the central part of the plane. The pilot, fuel and disposable loads are contained in the central compartment which is well insulated against aerodynamic heating by the fuel. The aircraft is shown in the take-off configuration with both air intakes closed and relieving doors on the top intake open all the way around. This arrangement permits the air to sink in and over into the intake annulus, then radially outwards to the jet exhausts which are normal to the surface around the whole periphery; about 15 inches from the edge. (Slide 6) Typical streamlines of the airflow through the aircraft are shown in this slide which represents any section through the circular form of the aircraft. This aircraft will have neither an oil system nor a hydraulic system, inasmuch as the engine is air lubricated and there is no retractible under carriage nor hydraulic operated controls employed. The control equipment in the cockpit will be much simpler. Normal flight and navigational instruments and equipment will be installed in the aircraft. A simplified form of ejector seat is fitted, as high ejection velocities are not considered necessary for this tailless aircraft. Now for a few general operational characteristics. The first model to be tested is expected to be able to have speeds up to Mach. 2.5, fly at altitudes up to 85,000 feet, and have a range of 1500 n.m. (one way). A later model with a diameter of 100 ft. and configured as a bomber, recon, or transport version is expected to have speeds up to Mach. 3.5 and ranges sufficient for intercontinental operations. Time to climb from the ground to 65,000 feet would be about 2 minutes. Let us now review briefly what we have in the offing. We have an aircraft capable of taking off and landing vertically climbing to altitude in an exceedingly short period of time, and able to cruise at very high speeds. In addition, it can hover, and has great lifting capabilities. And what does this mean? No requirements for long runways of concrete or other hard surface. No need for the new type aircraft carriers. Any naval vessel of sufficient size can carry an aircraft of this type. We have here an aircraft capable of great maneuverability and high altitudes. What would such capabilities mean to an invasion force. And how about its uses for pursuit, reconnaissance, ambulance, bomber, or transport. The artist conception of its use with a submarine is a particularly deadly combination. The installation of armament [SECRET, riscado]

[SECRET, riscado] is not seen to present any specific difficulty. Guns or rockets may be mounted in the nose, or to fire out of the intake. Similarly, radar may be installed in a nose pod or if scan is considered adequate, inside the intakes, where the drag penalty will be less. New types of side look antennas may work very well on this type of configuration. Guided Missiles may be carried externally. A larger bomber version of the aircraft is visualized as having more available payload space in the central well. The aircraft under study has an ample margin of thrust/weight to lift additional military load from the ground. Performance penalty will therefore only be felt at a somewhat reduced range and ceiling. Top speed is unlikely to be affected, since the drag due to lift is extremely small for this condition. Larger aircraft may be expected to have a longer range, but no detail figures are yet available. However, intercontinental ranges do not appear to be impossible. When such an aircraft has been proven by tests, it will no doubt have a great effect on the design and requirements for many other types of military equipment. Let us for a minute review some of the changes that might be apparent. RADAR - Due to the speeds involved, it is possible that the present type of airborne radar will be entirely inadequate. And, due to the possible speeds and altitudes, our presently designed ground radar equipment might be useless for most purposes. ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY - It is very doubtful that such weapons as now available in this field would be very useful. SURFACE-TO-AIR GUIDED MISSILES - The presently known G/M designs would hardly be adequate for use against bombers with speeds up to Mach. 3.5 flying at 80,000 ft. Especially if those bombers had a good capability for maneuvering. As one of the principal requirements for SAM appears to be to overcome the time delay in getting interceptor A/C into the air and to the target, it is possible that the job could be done better with an interceptor model of the gyroplane. AIR-TO-AIR GUIDED MISSILES - There is some doubt present designs would be very useful against such bombers. SUB LAUNCH G/M - What would be better - a manned gyroplane flying from a sub from 500 n.m. out, or a guided missile launched from 200 to 300 n.m. with the inherent errors of such a system? From an intelligence aspect this type of aircraft should be watched very closely. Mr. Frost has stated that the idea is not entirely his own. All of the basic information on the first model has been available to other nations for many years, especially those nations in Central Europe. Mr. Frost believes that other engineers could very easily have duplicated his effort. 4 [SECRET, riscado]

[SECRET, riscado] While the application of the "Coanda Effect" appears to be Mr. Frost's idea, he feels that such an application could have been apparent to engineers in Germany and the Soviet Bloc nations. Two particular reports, although of low reliability, are of interest. The first deals with an individual who, while riding a bicycle down a country road in one of the Satellite countries, observed a flying saucer descending from above and hovering above the ground. He stated that suddenly the saucer accelerated rapidly and while gaining speed and altitude wobbulated with a slight counter clockwise rotation until a certain speed was attained. Mr. Frost has been quoted as making the statement that his prototype would act in the same manner if full thrust was applied after hovering. The second report deals with a PW fieldhand who, with others, was at work when a saucer-shaped aircraft landed in a nearby field. He reported that the aircraft had Soviet markings on it and that one or more persons climbed out of the aircraft. Immediately police or some sort of authority appeared on the scene, placed a cordon around the aircraft and arrested this man's co-workers. The informant escaped and reported the incident. While it is admitted that such reports may be fabricated, the possibility cannot be overlooked that the information is essentially true. As an example, in the electronic field a review of low reliability reports has indicated that a large proportion of the sources gave an honest description of what they observed and that intelligence analysts failed to identify the equipment from such descriptions. We have reports of the French interest in flying saucer designs and of reported German activities in this field during the World War. Of the Germans supposedly in this field of activity we have four names. George Klein, who in April 1953 resided in Hamburg, claims to have been the chief engineer of all flying disc projects. However, his principal importance seems to be that he knew of the existence of such projects and has called attention to other Germans in the field. Otto Habermohl, who has not been heard of since the end of the war, is reported to have had a project for a 16 meter diameter flying saucer which was test flighted on 14 February 1945 at Holice. Rudolf Schriever, who died in 1945, was a designer/test pilot at BMW Works at Prague. He is reported to have constructed a flying saucer, which at a trial in April 1945 failed to leave the ground. Robert Miethe, who is supposed to have entered the U.S. in 1953, is reported to have constructed a 43 meter diameter flying saucer (V-7) which was flown with a crew of three in 1944. In August 1944, the Cesko-Moravske Works in Prague is reported to have received a production order for a short series, but none was finished by the end of the war. Miethe remained in Breslaw, whence he escaped in an ME-163 one jump ahead of the Russians. The Russians captured three of Miethe's principal assistants and his workshops. In March of 1954, a man by the name of Bruno Berbevich, who claims to have entered this country in October 1953, forwarded to the Senator from Ohio a manuscript and drawings of how he would build a flying saucer. These were in turn sent to the Legislation and Liaison Division of Headquarters, USAF, who sent them to AFOIN. General Samford's office had them sent to ATIC for translation from German to English. The big question is "Could this man be Robert Miethe?" Last, projects on the Coanda Effect have existed at two Satellite universities. It has been said that Mr. Frost has made the statement he personally believes that the Soviets could be as much as two years ahead of Canada at this time. If such be the case, the interceptor application would have a serious effect on the effectiveness of the Soviet Air Defense capabilities. 5 [SECRET, riscado] [manuscrito na margem: ? who said it?]

[SECRET, riscado] PART IV. SUMMARY. We have presented to you some evidence that flying saucers are within the capabilities of the existing "state of the art" in this country and Canada. The "state of the art" is well known in European countries. The Coanda effect has been known to all countries and the application is not beyond the capabilities of the Soviets. It is possible that German projects for flying saucers existed at the end of the war. The man considered possible tops in this field is supposed to be in the U.S. now. We have reports on eye witnesses of flying saucers in Soviet territory. PART V. RECOMMENDATIONS. It is recommended that: 1. The entire intelligence community be alerted to a possible Soviet activity in this field. 2. All existing files on foreign flying saucers should be reviewed and analyzed. 3. Bruno Berberich should be interrogated by intelligence analysts who have a full background on existing intelligence. 4. Robert Miethe should be found. Possibly Miethe could have changed his name to Bruno Berberich or some other alias. 5. A collection requirement should be placed on all agencies in the field including the Attaches. 6 [SECRET, riscado]

AFOIN-X/Lt Col Bloomer/tjc/54738, Wrtn 13 Jan 55. [SECRET, riscado] [manuscrito: X Samford, General] [carimbo: JAN 13 1955] MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SAMFORD. SUBJECT: Article "The Flying Disc" in December Issue of the Air Intelligence Digest. 1. During the latter part of November I was approached by Major Hosford and asked for a new summary or statement of position on UFO's, preferably classified, for use in the Air Intelligence Digest in connection with an article on a revolutionary new type of aircraft. I stated our position regarding UFO's and indicated that our best efforts in this field were constantly directed to discouraging, minimizing, and playing down any and all attempts at publicity, not excluding classified vehicles such as AID. 2. Major Hosford accepted this statement, indicating that the article on the new aircraft would be published without the companion piece on UFO's and suggested that I glance at the final draft. 3. I read the final draft and since I had not been previously briefed on this project I queried Major Hosford regarding AFOIN and Air Staff coordination. He replied in the affirmative and indicated that we were on solid ground but that the project heretofore had been handled very circumspectly. My final suggestion was to eliminate the last paragraph of the article with a UFO tie-in, which was probably overlooked before publication. 4. Since the receipt of the memorandum from the Executive Secretary of the Scientific Advisory Board (Tab A), my investigations have revealed the following: a. The extent of coordination on the article in AID was as follows: Mr. Bollum - 2C1; Mr Bachman - 2C1; Lt Colonel Farrior - 2C1; Colonel Zoller - 2C; Mr. Gilmore - 2B; Colonel Adams - 2A. b. Mr. Bollum was under an erroneous impression that the project had been favorably considered by the Air Council and so advised Major Hosford. c. Colonel R. M. Wray, Chief of the Aeronautical Division, Directorate of Research and Development, advises that the present state of the project within DCS/D is as follows: [SECRET, riscado]

[SECRET, riscado] (1) Despite the unfavorable tone of the Scientific Advisory Board, report responsible key technicians within DCS/D are split into two groups on the feasibility of the project. (2) In view of this feeling within DCS/D, General Putt's letter to ARDC the last week in December was, in effect, a compromised position. The letter directed ARDC to award a contract to A. V. Roe, Ltd., for certain wind tunnel tests, and further indicated that additional U. S. development funds would be decided on the basis of the data analysis produced. 5. During General Watson's last visit here he discussed with me a letter (Tab B) which had been prepared for his signature by one of his staff but which he refused to sign to you because of its tone. He feels strongly, however, that the monitorship of this project should be the province of ATIC and differs greatly in his personal views with the article in AID. 6. The Memorandum for Record (Tab C) explains the full background of the entry of OIN-2 into this project which briefly was governed by two considerations: a. A feeling in OIN-2C that this project was "hot" and that no one else was acting for OIN. b. Availability and "entree" afforded OIN-2 by Squadron Leader Wainwright. No action has been taken on any of the recommendations made in the M/R by Colonel Morrow and he has instructed Mr. Bollum verbally to discontinue further work and briefings on the project. 7. In view of the above I offer the following recommendations: a. Because of the divided opinions within and outside of the Air Staff on the feasibility of Project "Y", no further articles or briefings on this project should be accomplished without your personal approval. (Colonel Adams and Colonel Morrow concur.) b. No attempt should be made in an early issue of AID to state the case for Project "Y" in more objective terms since any attempt to do so would only serve to further "muddy the waters." OIN-2 and DCS/D concur. c. At their earliest convenience, General Watson and Colonel Morrow should have a discussion directed toward the transition of responsibility for monitorship of Project "Y" from OIN-2C to ATIC. Colonel Morrow and General Watson concur. 2 [SECRET, riscado]

[SECRET, riscado] d. No reply should be made to the memorandum from the Executive Secretary of the Scientific Advisory Board. JOSEPH A. BLOOMER, Lt Colonel, USAF, Directorate of Intelligence. D/I File Cy, X2B2. AFOIN-X, Lt Col Bloomer. 3 [SECRET, riscado]

[SECRET, riscado] DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE, WASHINGTON 25, D. C. 14 December 1954. MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE, AFOIN. SUBJECT: Scientific Advisory Board Report on AVRO "Flying Saucer" Project. 1. Attached for your information is a copy of a recent report of the Scientific Advisory Board on their study of the "flying saucer" project of A. V. Roe, Canada. 2. Your attention is particularly invited to the generally negative findings with regard to technical feasibility expressed in this report, in contrast to the general impression of technical soundness and optimistic expectations conveyed in the article on "The Flying Disc" published in the December, 1954, issue of the Air Intelligence Digest. 3. This report was submitted to Lt. Gen. D. L. Putt on 10 December in response to his previous request for SAB comments. /s/ Chester N. Hasert, CHESTER N. HASERT, Executive Secretary, Scientific Advisory Board, Office of the Chief of Staff. Inclosure: 1. Avro rpt, cy 2. [manuscrito: A; AFCSA 631] [SECRET, riscado]

[SECRET, riscado] 27 December 1954. Major General John A. Samford, Director of Intelligence, Headquarters USAF, Washington 25, D. C. Dear General Samford: I am quite concerned about the article, "The Flying Disc," and paragraph 1, "Editor's Notes," which appeared in the December issue of the Air Intelligence Digest. It caused quite a bit of consternation in my organization. This article was not submitted to my shop for technical coordination, probably on the basis that we were not interested. Mr. Bollum, AFOIN-2C, in his Memorandum for Record, dated 1 October 1954, indicates that my organization had very little interest (technically) in this development. My personnel have been attempting to acquire all technical information on this subject since February 1953 and they have been told this project is very highly classified, "stay out." Even with this roadblock, the Center has enough information to know that the technical information in the article is incorrect for the "medium size" vehicle. The AID range is 1500 NM, while A. V. Roe estimates 620 miles; the AID altitude was 90,000 ft, yet A. V. Roe states 80,600 feet to date. To make matters worse, the "large size" and the "small size" vehicle performance have no technical basis insofar as the WADC project engineer for SILVERBUG could determine. Our Air Force does not, at this date, have a development contract with A. V. Roe, Ltd., Canada, yet the article and Editor's Note will lead one to believe that we have this contract going full force. The last item noted by my people concerns security. This project is still of a sensitive nature due to the present negotiations between ARDC and A. V. Roe, Ltd., Canada. I am advised that WADC has advised Headquarters ARDC that the article violates the "need-to-know" of existing security policies. T54-18661 [rubrica] [SECRET, riscado]

[SECRET, riscado] Major General John A. Samford, 27 Dec 1954. I, therefore, suggest that the monitorship of Project SILVERBUG (UNCL) be removed from AFOIN-2C, and that in the future all technical information on this project be acquired from my analysts. Sincerely, H. E. WATSON, Brigadier General, USAF, Commander. [SECRET, riscado] T54-18661

[manuscrito: Scientific Board Report] AFOIN-2A4. 17 December 1954. MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF AFOIN-2A. SUBJECT: Flying disc article, Air Intelligence Digest. 1. Reference the Scientific Advisory Board report throwing cold water on the idea of support for the Canadian project, I have contacted officers in DCS/D and the Secretariat, Air Force Council, and have talked with Mr. Bollum of AFOIN-2C, who submitted the article to us. 2. Colonel R. M. Wray (x71510, 4B341), chief of the Aeronautics Division, Director of Research and Development, DCS/D, says that he has prepared a letter for General Putt's signature addressed to ARDC on the subject. He does not wish to reveal the contents of the letter until he is sure that it has General Putt's approval. He suggested I contact him again next week. 3. Major Linn (x79175, 5C940), Secretariat, Air Force Council, informs me that the Council held a meeting on 14 June 1954, at which representatives of A. V. Roe presented the case for Project Y. The Council took no action and has taken none since then. 4. Mr. Carl W. Bollum Sr. (x55867), AFOIN-2C1, holds strongly to his opinion that the project has merit. He points out that some of the material in the Scientific Advisory Board report does not disprove Project Y theories, but that the report instead states that it would take a good deal of expense to prove the theories. He feels that he is restricted in further pursuing this subject, since the word has come down to him verbally to discontinue work on it. He mentioned the Scientific Advisory Board report to Colonel Morrow this morning, and handed the colonel a copy of the report with the hope that he would be instructed to look into the matter. 5. Recommendations: a. That if a question comes from General Samford on this project, we advise waiting until we know the DCS/D decision before taking any action. b. That the DCS/D decision should strongly influence our own position on the subject. c. That, if the DCS/D decision is unfavorable, we consider additional material in the Digest modifying the original article. However, in view of the fact that the project is backed by a reputable aviation company and that there are divergent views on the subject, we should be cautious that we do not say the flying disc is impossible. BOWEN I. HOSFORD, Major, USAF, [cortado]

AFOIN-2A4. 28 December 1954. MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, AFOIN-2A. SUBJECT: Flying Disc Project. Colonel Wraye of DCS/D as yet (22 December 1954) has no final decision from General Putt on the above subject. When he receives the decision, he will notify me and has promised to get together in a discussion on it. BOWEN I. HOSFORD, Major, USAF, Directorate of Intelligence. [manuscrito: Bollum 2C1; Bachman 2C1; Farrior 2C1; Zoller 2C; Gilmore 2B; Adams 2A]

[SECRET, riscado] [manuscrito: Int 2-2-7; 1x ATIC; 1x over] AIR TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE CENTER, WRIGHT-PATTERSON AIR FORCE BASE, OHIO. 17 January 1955. Major General John A. Samford, Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, USAF, Washington 25, D. C. Dear General Samford: I thought you might be interested in what is being done in the matter of the A. V. Roe (Canada) Project Y-2 (Secret) which we discussed recently and the subject of which was recently given "popular" treatment in the AID. We have been thoroughly briefed by the Bombardment Aircraft Division, Director of Weapons Systems Operations, WADC, on their present knowledge. This Division of WADC has issued a one-year study contract, dated 29 December 1954, to A. V. Roe, Canada, on subject project. This study will attempt to develop sufficient analytical, design and test data to determine the practicability of utilizing the well known design principles which are employed, in the proposed vehicle. As you know, we feel very strongly that some truly factual data must be obtained to correct (or substantiate) the picture so far presented on this device by the Press and by the Air Intelligence Digest, a picture which doubtless provides comfort and support to popular writers on the subject. Accordingly, we have initiated a joint WADC/ATIC project which will result in a Technical Report to be ready 15 February 1955. This report will assemble all available information on the subject and will present such conclusions as can safely be drawn, this far ahead of the A. V. Roe study. It will be forwarded to you, without delay, upon completion. Sincerely, /s/ Harold E. Watson, HAROLD E. WATSON, Brigadier General, USAF, Commander. [SECRET, riscado] T55-0663